Anthony Loke Siew Fook (simplified Chinese: 陆兆福; traditional Chinese: 陸兆福; pinyin: Lù Zhàofú; Cantonese Yale: Luhk Siuh-fūk; Pe̍h-ōe-jī: Lio̍k Tiāu-ho̍k; born 28 April 1977) is a Malaysian politician who has served as Minister of Transport since December 2022, having previously held the portfolio from May 2018 to February 2020. A member of the Democratic Action Party (DAP), he has been its sixth Secretary-General since March 2022 and has represented Seremban in the Dewan Rakyat since May 2013.
Loke entered the Negeri Sembilan State Legislative Assembly as the representative for Lobak in 2004 and was elected to Parliament for Rasah in 2008. In 2013, he changed constituencies, winning both Seremban at the federal level and Chennah at the state level. He continued to represent Chennah until his defeat in the 2026 Negeri Sembilan state election by Siow Kong Choon of the Malaysian Chinese Association (MCA). He chaired Negeri Sembilan DAP from 2004 until August 2026, when Arul Kumar Jambunathan succeeded him.
Loke's first term as transport minister in the Seventh Mahathir cabinet included the regulation of e-hailing services, affordable monthly public transport passes, the introduction of child-restraint requirements and the launch of the National Transport Policy 2019–2030. During his second term under Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim, his ministry oversaw digital vehicle and driving licences, electric-vehicle road-tax changes, the revival or expansion of rail projects, maritime policy and the restructuring of civil aviation regulation. His tenure also attracted scrutiny over rail breakdowns, airport service interruptions, airline consumer protection and the cost of long-term transport procurement.
The party suffered serious electoral setbacks during Loke's second term as DAP secretary-general, including losses in the 2025 Sabah and 2026 Johor state elections and his own defeat in Chennah. At a special national conference in August 2026, DAP delegates nevertheless voted overwhelmingly to continue participating in Anwar's federal government, reflecting disagreement within the party over how best to reconcile its reform agenda with coalition governance.
On 19 September 2026, following a conditional pardon permitting former prime minister Najib Razak to serve the remainder of a prison sentence under house arrest, Loke announced his intention to resign from the Cabinet in protest. He submitted his resignation letter on 28 September, but Anwar Ibrahim asked him to remain in office temporarily. On 6 November 2026, when Najib's party paid the stipulated fine, Loke reiterated that his resignation would take effect only on Najib's arrival home to begin house arrest. Reports that evening indicated the Attorney General's Chambers had paused implementation of the transfer pending legal clarification; payment of the fine or a trip outside prison did not by itself satisfy the condition Loke had specified.

Early life and education
Loke was born on 28 April 1977 in Seremban, Negeri Sembilan. He attended St. Paul's Institution for his primary and secondary education and pursued Form Six studies at Sekolah Menengah Kebangsaan Seri Ampangan. He graduated from the National University of Malaysia (Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia) in 2000 with a bachelor's degree in Development Science and later obtained a Master of Public Administration from the University of Malaya.
Loke's grandfather, Loke Ching Fatt, operated Loke Ching Kee, a Seremban restaurant whose association with yee sang, a raw-fish dish served during Chinese New Year, has been the subject of historical reporting. The precise origins of the dish have been disputed. In January 2020 he presented a publication about the dish to the Yang di-Pertuan Besar of Negeri Sembilan, Muhriz of Negeri Sembilan.
A 2021 profile in the South China Morning Post described how Loke helped at his family's restaurant from childhood, waiting tables, taking orders and washing dishes after school and on weekends. Loke credited the experience of dealing with customers with helping to develop interpersonal skills useful in his later political career. These recollections give context to his upbringing but are his own assessment of its influence.
Additional reporting on Loke's upbringing recorded that his family roots are in Nanhai District, Foshan, Guangdong, and that he is a third-generation Malaysian Chinese. In an April 2024 interview on the Malay-language Keluar Sekejap podcast, he said that his interest in politics had been shaped in primary school by his father's support for DAP, his exposure to political talks, and time spent with a childminder's family in a poorer neighbourhood. He associated those experiences with an early interest in social inequality; this is his retrospective account of his political formation.
Loke has also discussed the language demands of being an elected representative. Although he comes from a Chinese Malaysian family, he stated in the same interview that he had not been fluent in Mandarin before entering elected politics, and subsequently took lessons to communicate with Chinese-speaking constituents and community organisations. Accounts of his linguistic development should not be taken to imply that Mandarin was his principal language at home or that his political work was limited to any one ethnic community.
In a 2022 interview, Loke described Malay as the language in which he was most comfortable, ahead of English and Mandarin, explaining that Malay had been the principal medium of instruction at school. His statements about his language background also informed his arguments that public figures working across Malaysia's communities needed competence in the national language.

Personal life
In May 2016, Malaysian Chinese-language media reported that Loke had married Ng Chi Ling in a private ceremony attended primarily by relatives. The couple had maintained a low public profile before their marriage.

Political career

Entry into the Democratic Action Party (1994–2004)
Loke joined the Democratic Action Party (DAP) in 1994, when he was 17 years old. His early political involvement was in the party's Negeri Sembilan organisation and the Democratic Action Party Socialist Youth (DAPSY). The DAP was then an opposition party and participated in several electoral alliances, including Barisan Alternatif. A contemporary biographical account described Loke as having risen through the party's youth and political education structures before holding elected office.
Loke began working full-time at DAP headquarters in 2002, during a period of financial strain and reduced parliamentary representation after the 1999 Malaysian general election. In a 2017 retrospective interview he recalled that the party raised operating funds by distributing and selling books by Lim Kit Siang through local branches. After joining the headquarters staff, Loke succeeded Hew Kuan Yau as political secretary to then secretary-general Kerk Kim Hock, whose experience he later described as formative for his party-organising career. Contemporary reporting independently identifies Loke as Kerk's political secretary in September 2002, when he issued information about Kerk's return to duty following treatment for cancer.
At the 2004 Malaysian general election, Loke contested Lobak in the Negeri Sembilan State Legislative Assembly as the DAP candidate and defeated MCA incumbent Khoo Seng Hock, representing Barisan Nasional (BN), by 1,842 votes. He was subsequently elected to the party's Central Executive Committee (CEC) and appointed director of political education for its 2004–2007 term. He also became chairman of the party's Negeri Sembilan organisation, a position he held for more than two decades.
Loke later contrasted his childhood impression of DAP, which he associated with social justice and defending disadvantaged groups, with his perception of its then political competitor, the Malaysian Chinese Association (MCA). Speaking to former UMNO leaders Khairy Jamaluddin and Shahril Sufian Hamdan in April 2024, he said he had never seriously considered joining MCA. These statements explain his political self-identification; they do not establish the motivations of other Malaysian Chinese voters or members of either party.

Youth-wing leadership and political mobilisation (2008–2012)
Loke was elected chief of the Democratic Action Party Socialist Youth (DAPSY) without opposition in December 2008, having previously served as the wing's secretary-general. His election followed the DAP's gains at the 2008 general election, when the party increased its parliamentary representation and entered several opposition-led state governments. A contemporary Malaysiakini account reported that the youth wing had experienced weak internal activity and poor attendance at its national congress. Loke promised to hold meetings of the youth leadership at least every two months and to rebuild political education and organising capacity.
In an interview shortly after taking office, Loke described DAPSY's outlook as moderately left-of-centre, combining democratic freedoms and equal opportunity with social-protection measures. He cited examples from opposition-led state governments but distinguished the wing's stated social-democratic commitments from revolutionary or fully socialist politics. He acknowledged that some delegates had been uncertain about the youth wing's identity and ideological position, making political education part of his proposed programme. These views were expressed by Loke at the time, rather than constituting a fixed or uniformly held ideology among DAP members.
At a DAPSY extraordinary congress in January 2010, Loke announced a campaign to register additional voters in constituencies contested by DAP. He proposed increasing the number of registered voters by an amount equivalent to at least 10 per cent of the existing electorate in each target seat, arguing that younger first-time voters might affect the outcome of closely fought contests. The goal was a party mobilisation target, not a measure of registrations eventually achieved.
Loke was involved in DAP's campaign for the 2010 Sibu by-election, where he argued that young voters could be important to the contest. On polling day, he raised concerns about discrepancies in the administration of postal ballots and requested an explanation from the Election Commission of Malaysia. His assertions were reported as complaints made by DAP poll watchers; the news reports themselves did not establish that fraud had occurred.
During the debate over electoral reform in 2011, Loke, as DAPSY chief, argued that civil-society groups including the Coalition for Clean and Fair Elections (Bersih) should be consulted by the parliamentary select committee on electoral reform. His intervention concerned representation in the reform process rather than an assertion that the proposed reforms had already been adopted.

Early electoral strategy and party organisation
A profile and interview published ahead of the 2018 Malaysian general election described Loke's approach to candidate placement as contesting electorally difficult seats rather than concentrating on constituencies already regarded as secure for DAP. He recalled moving from Rasah to Seremban at the 2013 Malaysian general election because of concern that the party could lose Seremban, and that a successor could retain Rasah. This explanation was Loke's own retrospective account rather than an independently established reason for every party nomination.
In an April 2013 interview with the Chinese-language daily Oriental Daily News, Loke framed Chennah as a strategic mixed and semi-rural constituency rather than a safer urban DAP seat. He discussed the importance of persuading voters across ethnic and party lines, and argued that a prospective opposition state government would require gains outside its existing Seremban-area strongholds. The interview preceded the election; it therefore provides evidence of his campaign position, rather than proof of how the electorate ultimately responded.

State and parliamentary representation (2004–2013)

Lobak and Rasah
As Lobak assemblyman, Loke represented an urban constituency within the Seremban area. He was re-elected in the 2008 Malaysian general election, defeating MCA candidate Siow Koi Loon by 6,928 votes. At the same election he also stood for the Dewan Rakyat seat of Rasah, defeating Yeow Chai Thiam of the MCA by 13,151 votes. The result gave him simultaneous responsibilities in the state legislature and federal Parliament.
Following the 2008 election, Loke was re-elected to the DAP CEC for the 2008–2011 term. He was also appointed secretary of the DAP political education bureau. On 6 December 2008 he became DAPSY chief, succeeding Nga Kor Ming, and held that post until December 2012, when he was succeeded by Teo Kok Seong. His work in the party's national administration expanded in 2012 when he was appointed national organising secretary and designated a DAP representative to the Pakatan Rakyat bureau.

Constituency changes in 2013
For the 2013 Malaysian general election, Loke moved from Rasah to the parliamentary constituency of Seremban, previously represented by DAP politician John Fernandez. He also transferred his state candidacy from Lobak to Chennah, in the Jelebu district. He won both contests: Seremban by a majority of 12,553 and Chennah by 1,098. Within the party, he retained his role as national organising secretary and was appointed to the DAP election and Pakatan Rakyat bureaux.

Electoral reform activism and Black 505 proceedings (2013)
Following the 2013 Malaysian general election, Loke participated in the opposition's Black 505 campaign, whose organisers alleged irregularities in the election process and held rallies demanding reforms. In July 2013, he and several other politicians and activists were charged under the Peaceful Assembly Act 2012 in connection with the 22 June rally at Padang Merbok, Kuala Lumpur. The reported allegations concerned compliance with the notice requirements and conditions imposed on the gathering, rather than conduct involving violence. Loke pleaded not guilty, as did the other persons charged.
On 1 November 2016, the Kuala Lumpur Sessions Court fined Loke, Rafizi Ramli and two other defendants RM1,950 each after they pleaded guilty to an alternative charge relating to the failure to provide the required notice for the assembly. The amount was below the RM2,000 fine threshold for disqualification from parliamentary office. The outcome was a conviction on the alternative charge, not an acquittal, and it does not establish that election-fraud allegations raised by the rally organisers were judicially substantiated.

National organising secretary and opposition politics (2012–2018)

Electoral boundaries and seat allocation (2014–2018)
As national organising secretary, Loke raised concerns about the Election Commission of Malaysia's electoral redelineation proposals. In November 2014, he alleged that possible parliamentary boundary changes in Negeri Sembilan could benefit United Malays National Organisation (UMNO), including by dividing the Rembau parliamentary area. The claim was reported as his allegation based on information available to him at the time; it was not a final finding that a specific redelineation had been adopted.
The issue persisted into the 2018 campaign. Loke said that proposed changes affecting Seremban, including the movement of the Rahang polling district into the Rasah parliamentary constituency, could complicate his re-election. He nevertheless reiterated that DAP would contest the Seremban seat, against MCA youth leader Chong Sin Woon. In the election, Loke retained Seremban with a majority of 30,694, although the result alone cannot determine what effect the boundary changes had on voting behaviour.

Breakdown of Pakatan Rakyat in 2015
As national organising secretary, Loke participated in public exchanges between the DAP and its then coalition partner, the Malaysian Islamic Party (PAS), over PAS's proposal to expand hudud-based criminal law in Kelantan and over elections to local authorities. In January 2015 he advocated resolving a disagreement over local council elections through the Pakatan Rakyat leadership council rather than a public debate between party leaders. In February he said that the DAP would expect PAS president Abdul Hadi Awang to attend coalition leadership talks.
In March 2015, after the Kelantan state assembly considered amendments to its Syariah criminal code, Loke criticised PAS for proceeding despite disagreements among coalition leaders. He said the DAP would review its position in Pakatan Rakyat. In June, following PAS's decision to sever ties with DAP, Loke stated that the opposition coalition could no longer continue in its existing form while adding that continuity of the Selangor state government remained a priority. The subsequent breakdown of Pakatan Rakyat preceded the establishment of Pakatan Harapan (PH) later that year.
In July 2015, police recorded Loke's statement under section 505(b) of the Penal Code following comments in which he suggested that demonstrations demanding Prime Minister Najib Razak's resignation could occur amid the political controversy then confronting Najib. The contemporaneous report establishes that police questioned him about the remarks; it does not establish that this questioning resulted in a criminal charge or conviction.
On 18 November 2016, police took Loke into custody for questioning about remarks made at a Pakatan Harapan convention ahead of the Bersih 5 demonstration. News reports linked the questioning to an investigation under the Sedition Act 1948; the material consulted for this account did not establish a subsequent conviction. This incident was separate from the Peaceful Assembly Act conviction relating to the 2013 Black 505 rally.

Registrar of Societies and party election dispute (2012–2018)
During 2017, Loke spoke for the party in a dispute with the Registrar of Societies (RoS) about elections to its CEC. The dispute concerned earlier internal elections and the eligibility of party delegates. In July, Loke said DAP would comply with an instruction to rerun its party election, but would do so under protest, maintaining that the party had addressed the regulator's complaints.
In October, he criticised conditions imposed by the RoS on the rerun, including instructions concerning how notices were to be published. The DAP's special congress took place on 12 November 2017. Loke was returned to the CEC, securing 1,175 votes, the fourth-highest total among the 20 elected candidates, according to the party's published results. The episode occurred during the DAP's preparations for the next general election.
The DAP's dispute with the Registrar of Societies traced back to an error in tallying the results of the party's December 2012 CEC election, followed by challenges to the legitimacy of the leadership and an earlier rerun in September 2013. Loke was one of the senior officeholders responsible for representing the party in discussions with the regulator. In July 2017, he said the party had repeatedly attempted to obtain clarification from the RoS and feared that a continuing registration dispute could affect its ability to use its familiar rocket symbol at the next election.
In August, Loke and party vice-chairperson Teresa Kok met the RoS director-general to discuss a proposed date and eligibility lists for the rerun. In October Loke objected to a subsequent requirement for election notices to be published in several major-language newspapers, calling it an unusually stringent condition. He said DAP would still comply with instructions to avoid jeopardising its status before the general election. These reports give both the regulator's requirements and DAP's response, without assuming that the regulator's actions were either unlawful or politically directed.
The DAP held its additional CEC election on 12 November 2017 under the supervision of independent auditors. Following the exercise, Loke retained the post of national organising secretary. The CEC also placed him in charge of its national election bureau, national organisation bureau and membership-screening committee, and designated him a public officer authorised to deal with party-registration matters.
In December 2017, Loke submitted the party's audited election report to the Registrar of Societies. On 6 February 2018 he announced that the regulator had formally accepted the November 2017 CEC election, bringing an extended dispute dating to the 2012 and 2013 party polls to an end. He called for outstanding applications to register new party branches and changes to the party constitution to be processed; according to his account, applications from approximately 200 branches had been held up while the internal-election dispute remained unresolved. This marked the regulator's acceptance of that particular election, not an adjudication of every political allegation raised during the preceding dispute.

Federal government and parliamentary leadership (2018–2020)
In the 2018 Malaysian general election, Loke retained both Seremban and Chennah. His Seremban parliamentary majority rose to 30,694 votes in a contest against the MCA and PAS. PH's victory ended BN's uninterrupted period in federal power, and Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad appointed Loke Minister of Transport on 21 May 2018. The appointment was his first federal Cabinet position.
Loke became DAP parliamentary leader on 11 July 2018, succeeding Lim Kit Siang, and continued to hold that party position while serving in Cabinet. His ministerial portfolio covered road, rail, air and maritime transport; the policies and controversies of his tenure are discussed below. His first ministerial term ended on 24 February 2020 following Mahathir's resignation during the political crisis that led to PH losing federal power.

Administrative reform and coalition responsibilities
In a June 2018 interview after taking office, Loke said the newly elected administration would review transport projects approved through direct negotiations rather than open competitive tenders. Proposals still awaiting final approval, including a possible third terminal at Kuala Lumpur International Airport (KLIA3), were to be reassessed; projects already under way would have to be considered individually. The statement reflected the PH government's broader review of procurement arrangements, not an announcement that every project mentioned would necessarily be cancelled.
Loke's simultaneous responsibilities as a minister, DAP parliamentary leader and Negeri Sembilan state chairman placed him in both federal government and party leadership. His role in parliamentary negotiations became more prominent after PH lost federal power in February 2020, when those offices provided continuity for DAP's parliamentary group during the change of administration. The political and ministerial aspects of his career are therefore treated separately below to distinguish party strategy from the administrative actions of the Transport Ministry.

Opposition and the political crisis (2020–2022)

Political realignment and prime-ministerial negotiations
The 2020–2022 Malaysian political crisis, often associated with the Sheraton Move, resulted in the collapse of the PH administration in February 2020 and the formation of a government led by Muhyiddin Yassin. Loke returned to the opposition benches. Subsequent negotiations among PH and allied groups produced disputes over whether Anwar Ibrahim or Mahathir should be proposed as prime minister in an attempt to regain parliamentary support.
In June 2020, Loke publicly described the impasse over proposed prime minister–deputy prime minister combinations. He said the discussions had considered Anwar paired with Mukhriz Mahathir and Mahathir paired with Anwar. His remarks illustrated the difficulty faced by the opposition in agreeing on a candidate able to command a parliamentary majority.

Confidence-and-supply arrangement and parliamentary reform
In September 2021, following the appointment of Ismail Sabri Yaakob as prime minister, PH entered a memorandum of understanding with the government on political stability and institutional reform. Its proposed measures included legislation to discourage party-switching by elected representatives, greater use of parliamentary committees and changes to parliamentary procedure. Loke, still the DAP national organising secretary, supported using cooperation between government and opposition to advance these reforms while retaining the opposition's right to scrutinise the administration.
After succeeding to the party leadership in 2022, Loke indicated that PH would consider further talks on the memorandum after the passage of the anti-party-hopping legislation. He argued that the agreement should be assessed by whether it enabled reforms rather than portrayed as automatically sustaining the incumbent government, which already had sufficient parliamentary support.

Secretary-general of DAP (2022–present)

Election and leadership transition in 2022
At the DAP's 17th National Congress on 20 March 2022, Loke was selected as secretary-general by the newly elected CEC, replacing Lim Guan Eng. Lim had reached the constitutional limit of three terms in the office and was elected national chairman. Loke received 1,625 votes in the CEC election. The congress took place shortly after PH's poor results in the 2022 Johor state election and alongside the retirement from active politics of veteran DAP leader Lim Kit Siang.
Loke presented his appointment as a transition to a third generation of DAP leadership and indicated that he intended to include both experienced and younger members in party decision-making. The transition attracted attention because the party had been led by members of the Lim family for much of its preceding history and was facing a more fragmented electoral environment.
In his first interviews as secretary-general, Loke rejected suggestions that senior DAP figures Lim Kit Siang and Lim Guan Eng would prevent him from exercising independent judgment. He cited earlier assignments from Lim Kit Siang to represent the party in opposition-coalition negotiations as evidence that its central leadership had allowed younger figures considerable operational discretion. The disagreement concerned the party's leadership culture and succession, not a formally documented division of authority under its constitution.

2022 general election and formation of a unity government
Loke led DAP's national organisation into the 2022 Malaysian general election, held on 19 November. DAP won 40 parliamentary seats, two fewer than in the preceding Parliament, and Loke retained Seremban with 63,920 votes and an official majority of 30,844. The election produced a hung Parliament, and negotiations followed between PH, BN and regional coalitions over the formation of a federal government.
On 24 November, Loke travelled to Kuching and met Abang Abdul Rahman Johari Abang Openg, Premier of Sarawak and chairman of Gabungan Parti Sarawak (GPS), and Sarawak deputy premier Sim Kui Hian. During the meeting, Loke apologised on behalf of DAP for previous remarks by party leaders that had offended the Sarawak government and its people. GPS had expressed reservations about cooperating with DAP because of earlier political disputes. Abang Johari subsequently said that the apology had been accepted. Contemporary assessments of the post-election negotiations described the visit as a significant contribution to improving relations between DAP and GPS.
Following Anwar Ibrahim's appointment as prime minister, DAP joined the new coalition government. Loke was appointed Minister of Transport on 3 December 2022. He said DAP would support Anwar's administration and framed cooperation with BN as a coalition agreement rather than an endorsement of any individual BN leader. Asked about Ahmad Zahid Hamidi's appointment as deputy prime minister while facing criminal charges, Loke stated that the legal process should remain separate from Cabinet affairs and that the composition of the Cabinet was a matter for the prime minister.

Cooperation with Barisan Nasional and the 2023 state elections
The new arrangement brought DAP into a federal coalition alongside BN, a grouping with which it had competed for decades. As DAP secretary-general, Loke defended the cooperation as a response to the inconclusive election result while acknowledging that coalition parties continued to hold distinct political positions. Ahead of the six state elections of 2023, he said PH and BN should help campaign for one another's candidates in seats allocated to their respective coalitions rather than compete against each other.
In June 2023, Loke distanced the party leadership from former DAP parliamentarian Tony Pua's criticism of BN at a fundraising event, saying the remarks were made in Pua's personal capacity and were not consistent with DAP's policy of cooperating with its coalition partners. The response showed the limits Loke was seeking to place on public disagreements within the new coalition.
Loke also addressed party discipline during the state election period. In July he said members who contested elections against official DAP candidates as independents would be subject to the consequences prescribed by the party constitution. After the August polls, he rejected suggestions that DAP should intervene in UMNO's internal leadership discussions and defended the continued cooperation between PH and BN, while analysts noted shifts in voting patterns and gains by PN in several states.
Loke's position was challenged by critics who argued that cooperation with UMNO risked weakening DAP's reformist commitments. He stated that the arrangement was necessary to sustain a parliamentary majority and that DAP could continue to advocate institutional reforms from within government. These were statements of his coalition strategy rather than independently verified assessments of the arrangement's success.
In a January 2024 interview, Loke argued that a federal minister must cooperate with state governments regardless of the parties governing them, including with politicians from the Malaysian Islamic Party (PAS). He rejected portrayals of routine discussions with PAS-led administrations as secret political negotiations, arguing that the fragmented party system required more regular intergovernmental engagement. In a related interview, he characterised the growing political influence of Sabah and Sarawak parties as a potential moderating influence on federal coalition politics. These were Loke's political assessments rather than a demonstrated causal effect of East Malaysian representation.

Response to Zahid Hamidi's discharge (2023)
In September 2023, the prosecution sought a discharge not amounting to an acquittal (DNAA) for deputy prime minister Ahmad Zahid Hamidi in his Yayasan Akalbudi criminal trial. The court granted the application, and the decision drew criticism over its implications for the government's anti-corruption commitments. On 5 September, Loke called on the attorney general to explain the grounds for the application in the interests of transparency and confidence in the legal system. He noted the prosecutor's legal discretion while urging a fuller account of the decision. The controversy also prompted renewed scrutiny of DAP's cooperation with UMNO in the unity government.

Internal party policy and re-election in 2025
On 16 March 2025, Loke was selected to serve a second term as DAP secretary-general, covering 2025–2028. Gobind Singh Deo became national chairman after winning the highest number of votes in the CEC election, while Nga Kor Ming became deputy chairman. Steven Sim Chee Keong, Hannah Yeoh and Ramkarpal Singh were appointed deputy secretaries-general. Loke outlined proposals to change the party's internal governance, including clearer candidate-selection procedures, new responsibilities for specialised policy and electoral offices, and a greater role for women in candidate selection.
Loke proposed making the DAP women's wing chief a permanent participant in candidate selection and set out a goal of nominating at least 30 per cent women candidates at the next general election. He also announced an education fund named after the late party politician P. Patto, intended to support disadvantaged students. These were party proposals and initiatives, rather than changes to national legislation.
In an interview after his re-election, Loke said he did not intend to remain indefinitely in the party's senior leadership and envisaged stepping down after three terms as secretary-general. He presented leadership renewal and internal institutional changes as priorities, although the timetable and implementation depended on subsequent party decisions.

Academic assessments of party organisation and leadership succession
A 2025 study by political researcher Francis E. Hutchinson of the ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute situated Loke's leadership in a longer transition within DAP from a relatively small, centrally organised opposition party to a party with multiple centres of influence in national and state governments. The study identified three overlapping challenges: succession between generations of leaders, the increasing importance of state-level party organisations, and the need to manage the expectations of supporters while participating in government. It characterised Loke as part of the party's third generation of leaders and documented his progression from national organising secretary, held from 2012 to 2022, to secretary-general.
Hutchinson noted that Loke ranked third among candidates elected to the DAP CEC in 2022 and fifth in 2025, even as the committee chose him as secretary-general on both occasions. The study reported that the distribution of other senior offices depended not only on candidates' vote totals but also on negotiations and organisational considerations after the committee election. It identified a public rapprochement between Loke and Nga Kor Ming during the 2025 campaign as an influential element of the leadership realignment, while acknowledging the limits of drawing firm conclusions about private internal-party decisions. The study's interpretations are distinct from the official election results and from statements by the politicians concerned.
The same study analysed the party's difficulties in broadening ethnic and gender representation and its tension between long-standing opposition commitments and the compromises of coalition government. It noted that Loke's proposed changes to candidate selection, including formalised selection procedures and a greater role for women, had institutional significance beyond the appointment of individual CEC members. These were scholarly assessments of party strategy, not an assertion that all of the proposed reforms had already been implemented.

The 2025 leadership contest and generational transition
Ahead of the DAP congress in March 2025, Loke publicly confirmed he would seek a second term as secretary-general, noting that the office's term limits permitted up to three terms. He said that he did not regard his fellow CEC members as rival political camps, although reporting ahead of the election described internal debates about the distribution of senior party offices and the future role of the Lim family.
At the 16 March election for the 30-member CEC, Loke received 2,508 votes, placing fifth. Gobind Singh Deo led the ballot with 2,785 votes, while former secretary-general and then chairman Lim Guan Eng retained a CEC seat with 1,719 votes. Some established DAP figures, including Teresa Kok and Lim Hui Ying, failed to win elected CEC positions. The CEC then reselected Loke as secretary-general and appointed Gobind as chairman and Nga Kor Ming as deputy chairman. Lim Guan Eng moved to an advisory position. Journalists and commentators characterised the changes as a generational shift, while Loke maintained that decisions about officeholders were taken collectively by the elected committee.
Some Chinese-language political reporting during 2025 and 2026 discussed the idea of a more pragmatic style of DAP leadership under Loke, in contrast to the party's longstanding role as an opposition movement. In a February 2026 interview, Loke rejected the idea that he had established a distinct personal doctrine, emphasising political practicality and implementing decisions through government institutions rather than rhetorical confrontation. DAP strategist Liew Chin Tong separately described the challenge as translating the party's earlier institution-building ambitions into achievable policies while in office. The phrase sometimes rendered as the "Loke approach" is therefore a journalistic and political characterisation, not an officially named DAP ideology.
A January 2025 interview with Sin Chew Daily, subsequently reported by Lianhe Zaobao, also set out Loke's view that completing the federal government's term and maintaining stability were prerequisites for assessing the governing coalition's chances at the next election. He said that he expected to leave the party's top leadership following the expiry of the secretary-general's permitted terms rather than seek an indefinite political career. These statements were personal intentions, not an announced parliamentary retirement date.

Relations with state governments and PH coalition politics (2024–2026)
Loke's party leadership also involved navigating different relationships with BN across Malaysian states. In October 2024, he said that DAP had not proposed a unity government in Johor and that its assembly members would continue to play a balancing role rather than seek positions in the BN-led state administration. He explained that federal cooperation between PH and BN did not require identical governing arrangements in every state.
In 2026, the recognition of the Unified Examination Certificate (UEC), awarded by Malaysia's Chinese independent secondary schools, continued to be a subject of debate. In May, Loke disputed suggestions that recognising the qualification would displace the Sijil Pelajaran Malaysia (SPM), emphasising that many UEC students also sat the national examination and that national-language requirements remained part of the policy discussion. The issue formed part of the wider debate over DAP's influence within the unity government.
In a February 2026 interview with Oriental Daily News, Loke urged Chinese independent-school students to demonstrate proficiency in Malay, saying this would counter stereotypes about their command of the national language. He announced an incentive for students at two independent Chinese schools in Negeri Sembilan who achieved an A+ in SPM Malay. The proposal related to local educational encouragement rather than a change in federal qualification-recognition law.

Institutional reform priorities (2025–2026)
Loke's party leadership continued to emphasise reforms that PH had advocated while in opposition. In March 2026, after a constitutional amendment to limit a prime minister's tenure to ten years failed to secure the required parliamentary majority, the DAP CEC urged the government to reintroduce the measure. The party's statement, issued by Loke, described the proposal as part of a broader institutional reform programme; it should not be read as proof that DAP alone had the votes required for its passage.
At the August 2026 party conference, Loke again identified the separation of the offices of attorney general and public prosecutor, limits on prime-ministerial tenure and anti-corruption measures as reforms that DAP wanted the unity government to advance. He denied that these demands were exclusively a DAP negotiating position, saying they formed part of commitments agreed by PH and its coalition partners. This account reflected the party leadership's interpretation of the shared reform programme.

Electoral defeats and reassessment in 2026

Electoral strategy and coalition disagreements before the 2026 contests
In a lengthy interview with The Edge in April 2026, Loke advocated holding the next general election and relevant state elections concurrently, citing administrative cost and the confusion caused by diverging coalition arrangements. He also said that a government's completion of a parliamentary term did not require it to serve the full five-year maximum, distinguishing electoral timing from a change of prime minister within the term. The interview presented his preferred political strategy, not an announced election timetable.
Following the heavy defeat of PH candidates at the 2026 Johor state election, Loke rejected calls for DAP to leave the PH coalition immediately. In a July interview with CNA, he argued that ending cooperation with Anwar Ibrahim's party would create further uncertainty and could benefit political opponents. His position was contested by members and commentators who believed that coalition cooperation had limited DAP's independence. This division was subsequently considered at the party's August special conference.
Interviewed again by The Edge during the Negeri Sembilan campaign in late July, Loke acknowledged that Chennah would be closely contested and drew a distinction between PH losing votes and the transfer of votes from PN to BN. He argued that opposition parties' coordination in Johor and Negeri Sembilan had changed the structure of electoral competition. These explanations were Loke's own interpretation of the results and should not be mistaken for a formal statistical study of individual voter movements.

Collapse of the Negeri Sembilan unity administration
The early 2026 Negeri Sembilan political crisis began when UMNO assembly members withdrew support for PH's Menteri Besar, Aminuddin Harun, despite the coalitions having cooperated at the 2023 state election. On 27 April, Loke, then Negeri Sembilan DAP chairman, publicly supported Aminuddin's continuation in office and accused UMNO of breaking the pre-election understanding. His allegation was contested in the wider dispute between state coalition leaders; the constitutional question of who commanded a majority was distinct from the political question of which party had reneged on an agreement.
Loke said at the end of April that UMNO president Ahmad Zahid Hamidi had told a Cabinet meeting he did not support the formation of a new state government through an alternative legislative majority. In May Loke disclosed that PH and BN had discussed a possible confidence and supply agreement, under which UMNO assembly members could vote for state supply bills without holding positions on the state executive council. He said he understood that UMNO had instructed its state representatives to continue supporting the budget, but also acknowledged uncertainty over whether any arrangement would endure. His comments were accounts of negotiations, not evidence that a final, enforceable written agreement had been executed.
On 24 May, Loke publicly suggested that dissolving the state assembly and calling a new election might be preferable to continuing the political impasse. He stressed that the decision rested with Aminuddin, who would have to consult coalition leaders and seek the ruler's consent. On 8 June, following moves towards an early state poll, Loke argued that the dissolution was an effort to prevent a potential failure of the state budget and government paralysis, rather than an attempt by PH to obtain a more favourable electoral timetable. Other parties offered different explanations for the loss of confidence in Aminuddin's administration.
The crisis intersected with a separate constitutional dispute concerning the status and powers of the Yang di-Pertuan Besar of Negeri Sembilan, Muhriz of Negeri Sembilan. Loke criticised attempts by some state actors to use the royal dispute as a justification for realigning the state government, while his opponents disputed PH's account of the crisis. Contemporary coverage described legal and customary questions about the role of the state's hereditary chiefs and ruler; these competing assertions should not be collapsed into a definitive legal conclusion in a biographical article.

Johor and Negeri Sembilan elections
DAP suffered setbacks in several state elections during Loke's second term as secretary-general. In the November 2025 Sabah election, it failed to retain the seats it had previously held. At the 2026 Johor state election in July, DAP won six of the 17 seats it contested, down from ten in the preceding state assembly. Both results raised questions among party members about DAP's participation in the unity government, the pace of institutional reforms and the ability of PH to retain voter support.
Following DAP's failure to win any of the eight constituencies it contested in the November 2025 Sabah election, Loke accepted responsibility for the party's performance and said its national leadership would review its electoral strategy. The party had won six Sabah assembly seats at the previous election. The subsequent setback in Johor in July 2026 intensified debate within the party over whether its visibility in government and the pace of policy reform had damaged its established electoral appeal. Loke and party delegates disagreed over the best response, including whether remaining in the Cabinet was the most effective means of securing further reforms.
In a July 2026 interview, Loke rejected calls for DAP to leave PH, saying he considered coalition politics necessary for the party to exercise influence in a multi-ethnic country. He also acknowledged voters' dissatisfaction and the challenge of balancing policy reform against the demands of coalition stability. He oversaw PH's campaigning in Negeri Sembilan, where he sought a fourth term as Chennah assemblyman.
At the 2026 Negeri Sembilan state election on 1 August, Loke lost Chennah to MCA candidate Siow Kong Choon of BN, who secured 5,726 votes (53.20%) to Loke's 5,038 (46.80%), giving Siow a majority of 688. The result ended Loke's 13-year tenure as the constituency's assemblyman. The official record lists 10,919 ballots cast and a 75.71 per cent turnout. PH lost its previous control of the Negeri Sembilan state administration, with BN and PN able to form a different governing arrangement. Commentators also noted that DAP's performance in Sabah, Johor and Negeri Sembilan had placed pressure on its national leadership.
Political analysts interviewed after Loke's loss in Chennah gave differing accounts of its significance. Some regarded the defeat as evidence of the limits of DAP's appeal outside its stronger urban constituencies and a possible opportunity for critics of Loke within the party. Others cautioned against treating an individual state-seat loss as proof of an imminent national leadership change. The assessments were projections about party politics, distinct from the officially recorded result and from any subsequent internal party vote.

The 2026 state election campaign and its aftermath
In July 2026 Loke campaigned both as Chennah's PH incumbent and as state DAP chairman. PH put forward an objective of gaining 23 of the 36 assembly seats to govern independently of BN. Loke framed the target as a response to the breakdown of the previous state governing arrangement. During the campaign he accused some BN figures of using racial appeals and rejected suggestions that PH would undermine Malay political representation; those accusations were part of contested campaign rhetoric rather than findings adopted here as fact.
The 1 August election returned a 36-member assembly divided among BN (18 seats), PH (11) and PN (seven), according to the official reported results. Loke lost Chennah by 688 votes to BN's Siow Kong Choon, obtaining 5,038 votes to Siow's 5,726. Both the defeat and PH's reduced representation became central to subsequent debates inside DAP about its position in the federal government. Separate accounts characterised the losses differently; the statewide results alone do not establish a single cause for voters' decisions.
A September 2026 analysis by political researcher Tricia Yeoh of the ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute placed the result within a broader decline in PH support among Malay voters in Negeri Sembilan, while distinguishing statewide shifts from patterns in individual seats. Her analysis identified Chennah as a mixed electorate—approximately 47.8 per cent Malay and 42.6 per cent Chinese—and reported an estimate that PH's share of Malay votes there rose from around 13–14 per cent in 2023 to roughly 20 per cent in 2026. This helps explain why Loke's narrow defeat should not simply be treated as evidence that every segment of his constituency shifted against him. The ethnic vote estimates were research estimates, not an official release of individually identified votes.
Yeoh also discussed how a dispute involving the hereditary Undang chiefs and the state's royal institutions became entangled with campaigning. In a survey of 1,800 respondents limited to Klawang, Paroi and Lenggeng, 55 per cent reportedly blamed Loke for the Undang dispute; the figure was not a statewide opinion poll and did not measure voters' views in Chennah. The study attributed the election outcome to several interacting political and demographic dynamics rather than a single leader's decisions. Loke had himself disputed suggestions that he interfered with the royal institutions.

Resignation as Negeri Sembilan DAP chairman
On 3 August 2026, after the state election, Loke announced that he would resign as chairman of Negeri Sembilan DAP, a position he had held since 2004. He said he was taking responsibility for the state organisation's electoral performance and wanted the state committee to select a successor. He retained his post as national secretary-general, and senior party figures in other states expressed support for his continued national leadership.
The state party committee unanimously selected Arul Kumar Jambunathan, the Nilai assemblyman and a DAP national vice-chairman, as its new chairman effective 10 August. Loke's resignation therefore brought an end to 22 years as the state's DAP chairman, while his national party leadership and Seremban parliamentary seat were unaffected.

August 2026 national delegates' conference on government participation
Following the consecutive electoral setbacks, DAP held a national delegates' conference at the Putrajaya International Convention Centre on 16 August 2026 to decide whether its leaders should remain in the federal government. Loke argued that a decision of this magnitude should be made by party delegates rather than solely by the CEC, and said that members should be able to debate the issue openly.
The motion to remain in the unity government received 1,857 votes, while 242 delegates voted to withdraw and seven ballots were spoilt. Loke said that members who had opposed the leadership's preferred course would not be penalised. He also stated that the party would convey delegates' concerns to the Cabinet, including demands for greater progress on anti-corruption measures, separation of the attorney general and public prosecutor roles, and limits on the tenure of the prime minister. The vote reaffirmed DAP's continued role in government without ending debate over its effectiveness within the coalition.

Participation, dissent and multiracial policy
The 16 August conference was attended by 2,223 of DAP's 4,264 eligible delegates, or approximately 52 per cent. A total of 2,106 ballots were cast on the coalition question, of which seven were spoilt. Although 1,857 of the valid ballots supported remaining in government, the turnout prompted criticism about the extent to which non-attending delegates had participated in deciding the party's direction. Loke responded that many delegates were working people who could not attend and said the participation rate was acceptable for a meeting without leadership elections. The attendance figures and his response were reported separately from the formal vote result.
Loke said the decision to remain in government was not an unconditional endorsement of Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim's administration. He told delegates that DAP still expected action on agreed reforms and continued to identify itself as a multiracial party, rather than one representing only Chinese Malaysians. In the party's sixtieth anniversary year he acknowledged persistent difficulty in extending DAP's support across ethnic communities; these were policy positions announced by party leadership, not measurements of actual public sentiment.

Najib Razak's conditional pardon and Loke's resignation pledge
On 18 September 2026, former prime minister Najib Razak received a conditional pardon concerning the remainder of his SRC International prison sentence, allowing house arrest subject to conditions including a RM50 million fine. The announcement triggered criticism from civil society groups and renewed debate within the unity government about the treatment of those convicted of corruption. The following day, Loke announced that DAP's CEC had agreed he would resign as Transport Minister in protest. The party's other ministers and deputy ministers were to remain in their posts, and DAP would continue supporting the government.
Loke delivered a resignation letter to Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim on 28 September. According to his account the next day, Anwar asked him to continue exercising his ministerial duties temporarily, and Loke said his departure would take effect when Najib physically arrived at his home. This distinction between a submitted resignation and its effective date became significant as arrangements for Najib's transfer were reported in subsequent weeks.
On 6 November 2026, UMNO announced that the RM50 million fine had been paid and proceedings connected with Najib's proposed transfer from Kajang Prison to house arrest were under way. At a news conference at the Transport Ministry, Loke reiterated that his resignation would take effect immediately upon Najib's arrival at his residence, rather than on payment of the fine or the signing of an order. Reports available in the early evening described the resignation as conditional and did not identify a confirmed successor to the transport portfolio. Contemporaneous accounts differed over the status of Najib's transfer. Reuters reported that the Attorney General's Chambers of Malaysia had directed that implementation of house arrest be temporarily suspended pending clarification of the royal pardon and court order; subsequent afternoon reporting described vehicles leaving the prison compound and Loke waiting for confirmation of Najib's actual arrival home. None of these reports by itself established that Loke's stated condition for departure from office had been fulfilled. Later reports from the Associated Press also described a temporary suspension pending legal clarification; the available accounts did not establish that Najib had physically reached his residence and begun house arrest. The stated intention concerned his Cabinet office, not his DAP secretary-generalship or his parliamentary mandate.
For the policies, administration and public controversies of his ministerial terms, see the following section.

At the August national conference, Loke apologised to delegates for losing Chennah and said the result illustrated how difficult DAP still found it to gain broad support across ethnic communities. He estimated that support from Malay voters in the seat remained relatively limited; that estimate was his own assessment, not a published individual-level voting survey. He maintained that DAP should continue pursuing a multiracial electorate rather than retreat to a narrower constituency base.

Positions on the Negeri Sembilan royal dispute and opposition strategy (September–October 2026)
Following the state election, a dispute concerning the authority of the Negeri Sembilan ruler and the status of members of the state executive council continued. In September, Loke criticised a statement by state executive councillors purporting to recognise the removal of Tuanku Muhriz. He argued that councillors who had recently sworn allegiance to the ruler should resign if they no longer recognised his authority. The state's royal and legal institutions, the Menteri Besar and other political parties disputed the constitutional implications, making the controversy wider than Loke's own statements.
In early October, Loke defended DAP's adherence to constitutional monarchy in an exchange with PAS information chief Ahmad Fadhli Shaari, who had challenged his account of the state crisis. Loke described the dispute as one concerning the legitimacy of a statement about the ruler, while PAS and other actors raised questions about the scope of executive and royal powers. His comments attracted coverage as part of the continuing political confrontation after the election, rather than a binding legal ruling.
In an October interview after the series of state-election defeats, Loke said DAP continued to favour preserving PH as a national alliance but would not rule out reviewing whether it should contest the next general election independently. He attributed frustration among some Chinese voters to limitations on what DAP could achieve in a broad coalition and said the decision on future alliances should be taken nearer dissolution of Parliament. This was a discussion of possible strategy, not an announcement that DAP had left PH or would definitely contest on its own.
In October he also addressed PH's preparations for the forthcoming Melaka state election, stating that the alliance would concentrate on the 21 seats it had identified for contest and would not nominate candidates in the remaining seven. The approach reflected a review of electoral strategy after the Johor and Negeri Sembilan defeats, rather than a final agreement on the identity of every candidate or on cooperation with other parties.

Political positions and institutional reform proposals
Loke has described DAP's ideological tradition in terms of parliamentary democracy, multiculturalism and social democracy. His earlier DAPSY statements emphasised social protection, equal access to opportunity and a moderate left-of-centre orientation. As DAP secretary-general, he has increasingly addressed institutional design, coalition governance and internal party procedure, reflecting the party's shift from its historical opposition role to participation in federal government.
During the debate over the PH–government memorandum of understanding in 2021 and 2022, Loke argued for political reforms that could command support across the government–opposition divide. In March 2022 he proposed a second memorandum, including parliamentary involvement in appointments of senior officeholders and more equitable development allocations to constituencies, while maintaining that DAP and BN would still contest against one another at a future election. The proposals were part of the political debate under Prime Minister Ismail Sabri Yaakob; they were not all adopted as legislation.
At the DAP national congress in March 2025, Loke advocated a constitutional limit of two terms for Malaysia's prime minister and reforms to party candidate selection. Independent political research has presented these proposals as examples of the party seeking to sustain a reform-oriented profile while working with coalition partners, including parties with which it had previously been in opposition. Their future implementation and impact remained separate questions from Loke's announcements.
Loke has defended DAP's decision to raise disagreements within the Cabinet while staying in the coalition, contending that government participation requires both negotiation and compromise. Asked in April 2024 whether his party had become too similar to MCA, he argued that DAP could object to sensitive political decisions through government channels rather than solely through public statements. Critics of the government's approach to corruption proceedings and slower-than-expected reforms have disputed whether that strategy gives DAP sufficient leverage, illustrating the difference between his explanation of coalition discipline and the evaluations offered by the party's critics.
During the 2026 internal debate on DAP's participation in government, Loke argued that electoral setbacks should not cause it to abandon long-term institutional reform goals. In an August interview with Astro AEC, he said the administration should prioritise implementing agreed reforms during the remaining portion of the parliamentary term instead of basing every decision on its chances at the next election. This was a stated political priority rather than an independent finding that those reforms would be achieved.

Minister of Transport

First term (2018–2020)
Following PH's victory in the 2018 Malaysian general election, Loke was appointed Minister of Transport on 21 May 2018 in the Seventh Mahathir cabinet. He succeeded Liow Tiong Lai of the MCA and served with deputy minister Kamarudin Jaffar. His first tenure ended on 24 February 2020 following Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad's resignation during the 2020–2022 Malaysian political crisis. Wee Ka Siong of the MCA became his successor under the government of Muhyiddin Yassin.

Early changes in ministry administration (2018)
Within weeks of taking office in May 2018, Loke announced changes to administrative practices at the Ministry of Transport and the Road Transport Department (JPJ). In a Chinese-language radio interview published by Oriental Daily News, he said that senior officers should focus on service delivery rather than ceremonial receptions for ministers, and that JPJ should scrutinise driving schools and allegations of paid guarantees to pass driving tests. He also identified vehicle safety recalls and transparent licensing fees as early concerns. These statements document his announced priorities, without establishing that all identified practices were eliminated.
The early agenda also included calls for a greater emphasis on punctuality, clearer timetables and operational accountability in urban public transport. While DAP's contemporaneous policy communication welcomed an RM100 monthly transit pass and service-monitoring measures, that party-authored account is used here as evidence of its stated priorities rather than as an independent evaluation of improvements experienced by passengers.

Automated traffic enforcement and penalties
In August 2018, Loke announced the cancellation of outstanding summonses issued under the privatised Automated Enforcement System (AES), a network of cameras recording traffic violations. The first announcement covered approximately 3.1 million unpaid summonses, with a stated face value of RM435 million, and followed a decision to move the system's operation to the Road Transport Department (JPJ) from 1 September 2018. Loke criticised the structure of the earlier private concession agreements and said future summonses would remain enforceable.
The decision was controversial because motorists who had already paid their summonses were not offered refunds. Loke said the government could not reimburse payments that had gone to concessionaires, while critics questioned the fairness of distinguishing paid from unpaid penalties. In November 2018, the ministry reported that the eventual total cancelled had reached 4.03 million summonses, valued at RM605 million, after completion of the administrative review. Reporting also documented an increase in violations during the period preceding the new enforcement regime.

Procurement and review of infrastructure projects
In his first weeks in office, Loke said that approvals for some proposed infrastructure projects would be reviewed where procurement had been conducted through direct negotiation rather than competitive tender. In a June 2018 interview he cited proposals involving new airport capacity and railway equipment purchases as examples of schemes requiring scrutiny. His comments reflected ministerial policy at that point and did not amount to cancellation of projects that had already received final approval.
In August 2018, criticism of the cancellation of unpaid AES summonses developed into a public dispute with MCA leaders, including former transport ministers associated with the previous government's concession arrangements. Loke alleged the concession contracts required government payments to private operators even when summonses went unpaid. MCA politicians criticised the policy's fairness to motorists who had already paid. These were competing political assessments; the underlying cancellation and transfer of operational responsibilities were separate administrative facts.

Vehicle window-tint rules and police objections (2019)
In May 2019, Loke revised regulations on the permissible visible-light transmission of private-vehicle windows, allowing owners to use very dark tinting on rear windows and rear windscreens while retaining separate limits for front glazing. Police traffic officials objected that they had not been consulted on the latest changes and warned that opaque rear windows could hamper inspections and put officers at risk. Loke defended the amendment as consistent with international practice and said the ministry had considered views presented in an earlier consultation exercise; he acknowledged that no new workshop with the police had been held before the change. The disagreement was over vehicle safety and enforcement rather than the legality of tinting itself.
The new rules also allowed applications for exemptions relating to medical or security needs, for which approved permits carried fees. Loke said applications were subject to examination rather than automatically approved, and rejected suggestions that the policy existed principally to raise revenue. Critics nevertheless continued to debate both the safety and fairness of the arrangements.

Affordable public transport passes
During the 2018–2020 term, the government introduced the My100 and My50 monthly travel passes for Klang Valley public transport. Passes were available for purchase in December 2018 and valid for travel from January 2019; the RM100 option covered specified rail and bus services, while the cheaper option covered specified Rapid bus services. The policy sought to reduce commuters' recurring travel expenses and increase utilisation of existing rail infrastructure. In April 2019 Loke reported 117,506 unique My100 subscribers during the year's first three months and a rise in certain rail ridership measures, although these figures alone do not establish the pass scheme as the sole cause of ridership changes.

Regulation of e-hailing
The ministry introduced new regulatory requirements for the growing e-hailing sector, including Public Service Vehicle licensing for drivers, passenger insurance and inspection requirements. The measures were intended to bring app-based transport providers into a formal regulatory framework. Some drivers expressed concern about the costs and administrative burden of compliance. In May 2019, Loke clarified that e-hailing vehicles could remain registered as private vehicles rather than being reclassified as commercial vehicles, although drivers still had to meet licensing and other applicable requirements.

Aviation fares and road safety
In May 2018, Loke requested that the Malaysian Aviation Commission study whether maximum domestic airfares could be applied during festive holiday travel, particularly on routes between Peninsular Malaysia and East Malaysia. The review was prompted by complaints over high ticket prices around major celebrations, but the proposal was a feasibility study rather than an immediate economy-wide price ceiling.
On traffic enforcement, Loke emphasised that motorists should not assume future discounts on summonses. In January 2019 he stated that JPJ would maintain its no-discount approach to certain road-traffic penalties, arguing that regular discounts could undermine compliance. The position followed the one-off cancellation of older AES fines and illustrated the distinction he drew between removing penalties under an earlier disputed concession system and enforcing traffic rules prospectively.

Child restraint systems and road safety
In October 2018 Loke announced that child restraint systems would become compulsory in private cars from January 2020. He cited the need to reduce deaths and injuries among children and proposed public education before enforcement, together with measures to make approved seats more affordable. The introduction generated complaints about purchase costs and practical implementation. By November 2019, Loke said the JPJ would issue warnings rather than summonses for the first six months after the rule came into effect.
The requirement began in January 2020, with guidance to use child restraints meeting applicable United Nations standards. Loke said the authorities would monitor sales of non-compliant products and apply a gradual compliance approach. The distinction between the rule taking legal effect and the initial warning-only enforcement period was an important feature of the rollout.

Maritime cabotage and submarine telecommunications cables (2019)
In 2019, Loke introduced an exemption allowing specialised foreign vessels to repair submarine communications cables in Malaysian waters without the normal domestic-shipping permission process. The policy was intended to overcome a shortage of suitably equipped Malaysian repair vessels and reduce delays affecting international data connections. His successor Wee Ka Siong withdrew the exemption in 2020, generating a subsequent dispute over maritime protection and the country's attractiveness to data-centre and telecommunications investors. The initial exemption and its reversal took place under different administrations, and the impact on specific investment decisions was contested.

Johor Bahru–Singapore RTS review (2019)
Loke was responsible for negotiating Malaysia's temporary suspension of the Johor Bahru–Singapore Rapid Transit System (RTS) Link, a planned cross-border railway intended to relieve congestion at the Johor–Singapore Causeway. On 21 May 2019, he and Singapore transport minister Khaw Boon Wan exchanged documents suspending construction until 30 September while Malaysia reviewed the scheme's cost and design. A bilateral statement stipulated that Malaysia would meet the agreed costs of the suspension. Loke maintained that a temporary halt did not necessarily mean cancellation and said the government wanted to consider less costly alternatives.
The two countries subsequently revised the RTS design, and the project formally resumed in July 2020, after Loke had left office. Its resumption should therefore not be described as an action taken during his 2018–2020 ministerial term.

Civil aviation oversight and the FAA downgrade
In November 2019 the United States Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) downgraded Malaysia's civil aviation safety oversight rating from Category 1 to Category 2 following an assessment of the Civil Aviation Authority of Malaysia (CAAM). The rating concerned the regulator's compliance with international safety-oversight standards, rather than a finding that individual Malaysian aircraft or carriers were inherently unsafe. The FAA identified deficiencies in one or more areas of government oversight, including staffing, expertise or inspection practices.
Loke subsequently linked the downgrade partly to CAAM's ability to recruit and retain specialised technical personnel. In December he defended plans to consolidate the functions of the Malaysian Aviation Commission (MAVCOM) with CAAM as a means of improving the regulator's resources and financial autonomy. The proposed consolidation was not completed during his first term; its subsequent legislative implementation occurred during a later government and is treated separately below.

National Transport Policy 2019–2030
The government launched the National Transport Policy 2019–2030 on 17 October 2019, providing a framework for the development of land, rail, aviation and maritime transport. Its priorities included governance, accessibility, safety, environmental sustainability and integrated mobility. The policy was introduced during Loke's first term, though its implementation extended beyond that administration.

Second term (2022–present)
Loke returned to the Transport Ministry on 3 December 2022 in the Anwar Ibrahim cabinet, succeeding Wee Ka Siong. Hasbi Habibollah was appointed deputy minister. His second term focused on transport service reliability, digital administration, railway investment, road safety and aviation regulation.

Digital licences and road transport administration
On 10 February 2023, Loke announced that most Malaysian private vehicle owners no longer had to display a physical road tax sticker and could instead use digital versions of the Motor Vehicle Licence (e-LKM) and Malaysian Driving Licence (e-LMM) through the Road Transport Department's MyJPJ application. The policy formed part of an administrative digitalisation programme, with different requirements continuing to apply to some vehicle categories and users.

Driving-licence validity and renewal (2023)
In May 2023 Loke announced that eligible Malaysians could renew their driving licences for a period of up to ten years, extending the previous maximum period of five years. Drivers renewing for ten years in a single transaction were offered the final year's renewal fee waiver, subject to eligibility and existing disqualifications. The policy was a change in renewal administration distinct from the contemporaneous replacement of physical licence and road-tax documents with digital records.

MyJPJ and the MyDigital ID login controversy (2024)
The government's digital-licence programme later encountered controversy over how users should authenticate themselves. In October 2024, the MyJPJ application announced that users would soon have to sign in using the MyDigital ID national digital identity service. Public objections focused on the short implementation period, technical readiness and uncertainty about what users would need to do to retain access to their licences and road-tax records. Following criticism, the authorities postponed the compulsory transition.
A CNA analysis treated the reversal as an example of difficulties in government policy communication and implementation, citing analysts concerned that abrupt digital-service transitions could undermine public trust. The criticism related to the sequencing of the login requirement rather than to the underlying legal validity of digital vehicle documents. Loke's earlier 2023 announcement had introduced digital documentation; the later dispute concerned the separate national identity-login system.

Electric-vehicle taxation and incentives
Loke announced in June 2024 that Malaysia would adopt a new motor-vehicle licence (road-tax) structure for zero-emission vehicles, effective 1 January 2026 after the existing electric-vehicle tax holiday. Under the revised framework, fees for battery-electric and hydrogen fuel-cell vehicles would be calculated by motor power rather than conventional internal-combustion engine displacement. Loke described the new rates as approximately 85 per cent below the corresponding earlier calculation and presented the change as an incentive to adopt cleaner vehicles; the long-term effect on electric-vehicle sales and emissions was not established by the announcement.

E-hailing fares and delivery platform regulation
During his second term, Loke argued against imposing government-set minimum fares for e-hailing rides, saying that a price floor could benefit drivers while increasing costs for passengers. In November 2023 he said that fare-setting under supply-and-demand pricing would remain with operators, subject to continued ministry discussions. In May 2024 he instructed the Land Public Transport Agency (APAD) to investigate platforms that had introduced bidding between drivers and passengers, stating that the ministry had not approved that method.
The debate continued as gig workers pressed for protections against low earnings and changing platform commissions. In March 2025 Loke said the ministry was developing a regulatory framework for motorcycle-based delivery services (p-hailing). In March 2026 he referred disputes over the absence of a floor fare for e-hailing drivers to the newly established Malaysian Gig Economy Commission, saying that any intervention would have effects for drivers, passengers and platform operators. A referral for discussion was not itself an introduction of statutory minimum fares.

Vehicle-inspection market reform (2023–2025)
The Transport Ministry moved to open mandatory vehicle inspection to operators other than Puspakom, which had held an exclusive concession for about three decades. A Cabinet decision on 17 March 2023 authorised the introduction of additional qualified providers. Loke argued that competition could reduce bottlenecks and improve the integrity of inspections, but did not claim that the previous monopoly itself had been judicially found to cause bribery or that competition would immediately eliminate fraud.
On 7 February 2025 the ministry named three companies—Wawasan Bintang Sdn Bhd, Pakatan Petroleum Sdn Bhd and Beriman Gold Sdn Bhd—for a first phase of inspection centres at seven locations in Selangor, Kelantan, Johor, Pahang and Sarawak. They were given up to 24 months to develop premises and equipment, with operating licences dependent on fulfilling the conditions. Following opposition criticism of the selected firms' limited inspection experience, Loke argued that the monopoly had necessarily prevented competing Malaysian companies from developing such a record. He stressed that the appointments did not yet constitute operating licences or government payments for centre construction. These were conditional approvals, not evidence that seven new centres were already in service.

MYAirline suspension and consumer protection
On 12 October 2023, MYAirline abruptly suspended its operations, citing financial pressure. Loke criticised the company for failing to give the ministry and MAVCOM adequate advance warning and said the suspension affected approximately 125,000 ticketed passengers. The episode raised questions about airline financial oversight and the effectiveness of passenger protections; it did not amount to a finding that Loke personally controlled the carrier's financial decisions.
The government discussed possible remedies for affected passengers, including card-payment chargebacks through their banks. In January 2024 Loke said MYAirline should not receive a new air service licence before it had addressed customer refunds and obligations to former employees. The conditions he announced were positions taken by the regulator and ministry, rather than evidence that refunds were ultimately received by every passenger.

Public transport operating conditions and government scrutiny
In December 2022, shortly after his reappointment, Loke made an unannounced inspection of the Kelana Jaya Line during the evening peak period. He reported that only 38 of the line's 56 trainsets were operating, leaving the service unable to meet its planned frequency, and identified faulty escalators, lifts and other station facilities. He called for improvements to maintenance, rolling stock availability and operational monitoring.
Later assessments emphasised continuing problems despite new services and investment. A 2026 report by The Edge identified recurrent disruptions to urban rail and the Kuala Lumpur International Airport aerotrain as prominent criticisms of the ministry's oversight. Loke argued in interviews that long-lived transport assets had to be managed across administrations, while acknowledging that commuters ultimately judged services by reliability rather than ministerial announcements.

Women's coaches, passenger safety and walkability
The ministry supported the trial introduction of women-only carriages on the Kajang Line in September 2023, a measure intended to address harassment and safety concerns on crowded trains. Loke defended the arrangement against criticism that it reduced space available to other passengers, citing the share of women among public transport users. In December he announced plans to expand the programme to the Putrajaya Line, citing a reported fall in harassment complaints over the trial period. A short-term reduction in complaints does not in itself determine the programme's long-term effectiveness.
In July 2024, Loke identified poorly maintained bus stops and inadequate walking connections to stations as obstacles to increased public-transport use. He proposed working with local authorities and private sponsors to improve bus shelters and pedestrian access rather than treating the supply of trains alone as sufficient. The announcement was a programme of proposed improvements; it did not establish how many stops had been completed by that date.

Urban rail services and congestion
Upon his return to the ministry, Loke made improvements to Prasarana Malaysia's maintenance and operations a priority. In an interview published in August 2026, he said the company had been affected by frequent service disruptions, malfunctioning station facilities and declining confidence among commuters when he assumed office in 2022. He introduced a more systematic review of operational performance at post-Cabinet meetings. Disruptions reportedly declined during 2024 and 2025 but increased again in early 2026, especially on the older Kelana Jaya Line, where a shortage of additional trains remained an issue.
The Shah Alam Line (LRT3), a 37.8-kilometre route connecting Bandar Utama and Johan Setia, began operations on 29 June 2026 after an opening ceremony the previous day. The service expanded rail coverage in the western Klang Valley. Loke linked its opening to growth in urban rail use, while acknowledging that traffic congestion had not been resolved and that population distribution, increasing private vehicle ownership and first- and last-mile gaps remained structural challenges.
The ministry also pursued demand-responsive transport and feeder bus services to improve connections between residential areas and rail stations. Loke stated that serving dispersed, low-density residential neighbourhoods required a combination of approaches rather than a single standard transport solution.
Measured outcomes were reported alongside the continuing criticism of service disruptions. In January 2026, Loke presented figures for five rail routes operated by Prasarana, including the monorail: disruptions fell from 252 in 2022 to 31 in 2025, according to the operator's performance report. A separate July parliamentary reply counted 177 in 2022, 111 in 2023, 64 in 2024 and 28 in 2025, with 12 more in January–May 2026, for the LRT/MRT networks excluding the monorail. The two series should not be mixed because their coverage differs. For the LRT/MRT-only series, Loke also reported a rise in mean kilometres between failures from 90,000 in 2022 to 930,000 as of 31 May 2026. Both statistics were government or operator figures reported in the press, not independent proof that all passengers experienced the same improvement.

Airport privatisation and governance debate (2024–2025)
Loke supported the 2024 proposed privatisation of Malaysia Airports Holdings Berhad (MAHB), Malaysia's major airport operator, which was advanced by a consortium led by Khazanah Nasional and the Employees Provident Fund with overseas partners. He said the change could accelerate strategic and operational decisions, while emphasising that the transaction was proposed by shareholders rather than initiated by the Transport Ministry. The proposed involvement of Global Infrastructure Partners drew criticism from opponents concerned about its impending acquisition by BlackRock and the latter's alleged links to Israel during the Gaza war. Loke's support was one ministerial position within a transaction ultimately involving shareholders and finance authorities.
The transaction was completed and MAHB delisted in February 2025. Malaysia Airports' subsequent corporate profile states that the Malaysian government retained a special share and that Malaysian government-linked institutional investors together held 70 per cent through the consortium. Neither the eventual corporate restructuring nor its commercial performance should be attributed to the transport minister alone.

Kuala Lumpur–Singapore high-speed rail proposals
The proposed Kuala Lumpur–Singapore high-speed rail (HSR), discontinued after Malaysia and Singapore allowed the earlier bilateral agreement to lapse, became a renewed subject of discussion during Loke's second term. In March 2023 he said Malaysia was open to fresh proposals, provided the project was privately financed and did not create a new direct public funding commitment. He emphasised that a decision to resume the project had not been made and that the previous bilateral agreement could not simply be treated as still operative.
The government-owned MyHSR Corporation subsequently sought proposals through a request-for-information exercise. Loke's 2024 and 2025 Chinese-language interviews returned to the fiscal risks of state-funded high-speed rail, while indicating that private consortia might pursue different financing and operating arrangements. In January 2025 he said seven parties had initially shown interest and three had been shortlisted for further evaluation. That process did not itself constitute a final award, bilateral agreement or decision to build the line.

Penang Mutiara Line and federal–state infrastructure responsibilities
On 29 March 2024, Loke announced that the federal government would take over responsibility for the proposed Penang Mutiara Line light-rail project from the Penang state government. The decision followed Cabinet approval on 22 March and assigned MRT Corp, a company owned by the Minister of Finance Incorporated, responsibility as developer and asset owner. Loke said procurement would be separated into civil-works packages and systems and rolling-stock components, using open tender. The announcement was a change in project implementation responsibility and did not mean that construction had been completed at that date.
On 5 November 2026, MRT Corp announced a RM2.69 billion civil-works contract for a cross-sea extension between Macallum and Penang Sentral. The package involved a proposed 5.5 km alignment, including a 3.05 km sea-crossing viaduct. The award was a project procurement milestone under the wider federal rail programme, rather than evidence that passenger service had begun.
In later interviews, Loke argued that transport projects initiated by previous governments or administrations should be evaluated through their entire development and operating lifetimes, rather than credited wholly to the ministers who inaugurated them. The Edge noted in 2026 that several projects he had helped advance were inherited schemes and that delays, procurement issues and the reliability of existing infrastructure remained major operational risks. This distinction is relevant to assessing Loke's ministerial responsibility without assigning sole authorship to long-term infrastructure projects.

Intercity railway and freight development
On 11 December 2025 the Gemas–Johor Bahru Electrified Double-Tracking Project was formally launched at Kempas Baru, extending the KTM ETS network to southern Peninsular Malaysia. The 192-kilometre project, involving 11 stations, was carried out through the Ministry of Transport, Keretapi Tanah Melayu and the Railway Assets Corporation. The project predated Loke's second term, although its operational completion took place under his ministry.
Loke also advocated greater use of railways for freight, including planned improvements in rolling stock, an expanded rail logistics network and a proposed bypass linking the Seremban area more directly with Port Klang. In August 2026 he said that this bypass remained subject to approval by economic and finance ministries. The proposal sought to reduce competition between freight and passenger trains on tracks through Kuala Lumpur.

Passenger train leasing and procurement debate
In August 2024 Loke and Economy Minister Rafizi Ramli announced a proposal to acquire 62 passenger train sets for Keretapi Tanah Melayu through a government-to-government leasing arrangement with China. The estimated RM10.7 billion programme was intended to spread payments over 30 years, with maintenance, repair and overhaul responsibilities included in the proposed contract. Loke said the arrangement could shorten acquisition timelines and improve asset availability, but the reported estimated value was subject to negotiations and should not be represented as a final audited contract price.
The proposal also attracted criticism from transport specialists who questioned whether long-term leasing could lead to high overall costs and overdependence on a single foreign supplier. Consultant Wan Agyl Wan Hassan warned of possible maintenance, technological and geopolitical risks. These were assessments of a proposed procurement model, not established findings of contractual impropriety. The dispute highlighted the competing priorities of replacing ageing trains promptly and maintaining longer-term fiscal and procurement flexibility.

East Coast Rail Link and Malaysia–China transport cooperation
The East Coast Rail Link (ECRL) remained an important federal rail project during Loke's second term. In January 2026 he reaffirmed January 2027 as the target for opening its first phase, but emphasised that completing track construction was insufficient without successful testing of signalling, communications, traction and other systems. In August 2026 an inspection train began dynamic testing on the initial route; project representatives reported that construction had surpassed 95 per cent. These milestones were preparations for a future service rather than evidence that regular passenger operations had already begun.
In an interview with China's People's Daily website, Loke discussed proposed integration of railway freight with Malaysian ports, China–Malaysia aviation links and training of Malaysian rail operations personnel. Such descriptions principally document the ministry's expectations for bilateral cooperation; eventual economic and employment effects would require independent evidence after the relevant systems entered operation.

Search for Malaysia Airlines flight MH370
Loke was transport minister during renewed attempts to locate Malaysia Airlines Flight 370 (MH370), which disappeared in March 2014. At a March 2024 remembrance event he said the ministry intended to seek Cabinet approval for a new exploration arrangement with the marine robotics company Ocean Infinity, subject to a credible proposed search location and terms. The aim was to provide answers to passengers' families, although the renewed search did not guarantee a discovery.
The Malaysian government signed a new agreement with Ocean Infinity in March 2025 to search a 15,000-square-kilometre area of the southern Indian Ocean on a no find, no fee basis, involving a success fee of US$70 million if the aircraft's wreckage were located. Search work was interrupted by seasonal weather conditions and operational scheduling. By March 2026 the ministry reported that the new search had not produced conclusive evidence of the aircraft's location.
In June 2026, the Cabinet approved an extension of the search agreement for one year, from 1 July 2026 to 30 June 2027, retaining the no-find-no-fee principle. The extension was meant to allow further work in the unsearched portion of the designated area, subject to weather and vessel availability. In announcing the extension, Loke specified that about 7,428.54 square kilometres remained to be examined, and that the revised deployment schedule accounted for Ocean Infinity's other commercial commitments. The decision reflected the continuation of an unresolved investigation, not a determination of what had happened to the missing aircraft.

Maritime transport and port capacity
Loke's transport portfolio also included maritime trade and port infrastructure. At the beginning of 2025 he discussed proposed capacity expansion at Port Klang and the Port of Tanjung Pelepas, positioning both ports within the government's effort to improve regional logistics connectivity. Port Klang handled a reported 15.14 million twenty-foot equivalent units (TEUs) in 2025, compared with 14.64 million in 2024. These throughput figures describe port operations during his tenure, but do not by themselves demonstrate that any one ministerial initiative caused the increase.
In July 2026 Loke advocated the phased development of a third terminal for Port Klang on Carey Island, describing it as a long-horizon capacity investment. In October he said major west-coast ports should have complementary rather than overlapping functions, identifying Port Klang as a central transshipment and gateway hub and the Port of Tanjung Pelepas as a southern transshipment hub. The statements outlined strategic plans; projected future handling capacity was not a realised outcome at the time.

Submarine cable maintenance and cabotage reform (2024)
On 1 March 2024 Loke announced that the Cabinet would restore the exemption for foreign specialist vessels carrying out submarine cable repairs, after consultations involving technology and shipping companies. His ministry subsequently gazetted the exemption, effective 1 June 2024, covering installation, maintenance and repair of submarine telecommunications cables. The decision reversed the 2020 withdrawal and was framed as providing regulatory certainty for digital infrastructure investment; it did not itself prove that a particular foreign investor had chosen Malaysia because of the policy.
The same regulatory changes also restored cabotage requirements for certain domestic cargo movements involving Sarawak, at the request of that state's government. Thus the ministry's 2024 decision was not a general removal of cabotage protection for all shipping; it distinguished submarine cable operations from domestic cargo transport.

Singapore–Malaysia cross-border transport
In December 2025, Loke and Singapore Transport Minister Jeffrey Siow discussed revisions to the bilateral cross-border taxi system and tourism coach arrangements. Their ministries agreed in principle to broaden authorised pick-up and drop-off arrangements, improve passenger insurance protection and increase the number of licensed taxis while strengthening safeguards against unauthorised domestic trips. The measures were subsequently developed through bilateral transport-agency discussions rather than implemented solely by either minister.
On 6 November 2026 the two ministries announced that the quota would rise from 300 to 500 licensed taxis per country with effect from 16 November, and that CDG Zig and Kumpool would join GrabCar as authorised platform operators. The announcement was made while Loke remained in the ministerial role; the implementation date was in the future at the time of reporting.

Vehicle Entry Permit enforcement on Singapore-registered vehicles (2024–2025)
Loke renewed efforts to enforce the Vehicle Entry Permit (VEP) for foreign-registered vehicles using the Malaysia–Singapore land crossings. In May 2024, he announced an October deadline, but JPJ initially pursued staged implementation and warnings while motorists sought to register and activate RFID tags. The phased rollout prompted complaints about application bottlenecks and appointment availability. Full enforcement with an RM300 compound for unregistered Singapore vehicles was subsequently announced for 1 July 2025. The difference between the first publicised deadline and the later fine-enforcement date matters when describing what the rules required at a given time.

Commercial-vehicle speed limiters and enforcement
A June 2025 crash involving a chartered bus carrying students from Sultan Idris Education University renewed public attention to commercial-vehicle safety. Following the crash, which killed 15 students, Loke said the ministry was developing mandatory speed limiter requirements for heavy vehicles. The proposal formed part of wider efforts to improve road safety and the monitoring of buses and heavy goods vehicles; investigations of the crash itself were separate from the development of the policy.
The first phase of enforcement began in October 2025. In December, the ministry reported that the proportion of covered vehicles complying with the requirements had risen from 2.68 per cent at the beginning of the phase to 48.37 per cent at the start of December. On 27 October 2026, Loke told Parliament that verified speed limitation devices were installed in 106,651 of 207,083 active commercial vehicles within one category of the programme, representing 51.5 per cent, while compliance among older vehicles requiring retrofits was considerably lower. The figures described different stages and vehicle categories and should not be merged into a single comparison without qualification.
In January 2026 Loke also suggested that the JPJ should modernise enforcement to reduce congestion caused by traditional roadside checkpoints. He proposed greater use of data and automatic number-plate recognition to identify violations without stopping every vehicle. The remarks were a policy direction under consideration and did not establish that all conventional checkpoints had been replaced.

MYEG and Zetrix revenue-collection dispute (2026)
On 5 October 2026 the Transport Ministry and Road Transport Department (JPJ) suspended My E.G. Sdn Bhd and Zetrix AI Bhd as agents collecting road-tax, licence-renewal and traffic-fine payments. Loke said that the companies had not remitted RM314 million of government money collected between 19 May and 30 September, despite 35 reminders and four engagement sessions. He said a RM231 million cheque submitted to address some of the arrears could not be processed following instructions from the company. The ministry said it would pursue the arrears and keep JPJ transactions available through other channels.
Loke rejected suggestions that the suspension was politically motivated, while MCA figures questioned why revenue-payment noncompliance had been allowed to accumulate before suspension. Zetrix publicly acknowledged the arrears and said it had offered the government a proposal to resolve them. A 23 October report said the amount was still unpaid at that time. The minister's allegations, the firms' statements and the opposition's criticisms should be attributed separately; the reports do not amount to a final court determination about liability or government oversight.

Road safety and aviation
In March 2024, Loke disclosed police figures recording 6,443 road deaths in Malaysia during 2023, including approximately 4,480 deaths involving motorcycles. He said the government intended to publish road-crash statistics more frequently to increase public awareness and policy attention. The figures represented recorded fatalities, not a measure of the ministry's success or failure, and the announcement of daily publication should be distinguished from evidence about its later implementation.
In November 2024, an 18-year-old passenger died after being electrocuted while charging a mobile phone on an express bus, raising questions about passenger safety and the condition of onboard electrical installations. Loke announced inspections and action against the bus operator, saying that the company had failed a safety and health audit under the transport operator code. He stated that APAD would handle any licence action, with an appeal route available to the operator. The incident involved administrative enforcement decisions following the death, not a judicial determination of criminal responsibility by the minister.
In 2025 and 2026 the ministry faced renewed scrutiny of heavy vehicle and public service vehicle safety following serious crashes. Loke described tighter enforcement, telematics and improved safety monitoring as priorities, while acknowledging opposition from parts of the transport industry to compliance costs. In the aviation sector, he noted that most airline ticket prices were market-driven, although limited-time fare controls were applied on selected Peninsular Malaysia–East Malaysia routes during festive periods.
The government dissolved the Malaysian Aviation Commission (MAVCOM) and transferred its regulatory functions to the Civil Aviation Authority of Malaysia (CAAM) on 1 August 2025, under the Malaysian Aviation Commission (Dissolution) Act 2024. CAAM thereby assumed aviation economic oversight alongside safety and security regulation, including airline licensing, traffic rights, market competition and passenger protection. The regulator said existing consumer complaint channels such as FlySmart would remain available during the transition. This was an enacted institutional reorganisation, not merely a plan announced by the minister.

Railway safety, airport operations and accountability
In 2025 and 2026, the ministry faced continuing public criticism over the renewal and reliability of the KLIA Aerotrain at Kuala Lumpur International Airport. In January 2025, Loke declined to give a firm opening date while technical and integration tests remained incomplete. The Aerotrain resumed operations in July but experienced additional interruptions. Loke said in August that one interruption was a software issue quickly rectified rather than a mechanical breakdown. The public criticism continued after the reopening, and a year-end assessment in The Edge identified the Aerotrain and disruptions to Klang Valley rail services as major operational challenges.
In October 2025, after repeated disruptions, Loke said the ministry would not interfere if the Malaysian Anti-Corruption Commission decided to investigate allegations connected with the Aerotrain project. He distinguished the ministry's regulatory role from the contractual responsibility of the airport operator, Malaysia Airports. A report in The Edge in April 2026 said the ministry had considered potential regulatory penalties and continued to face difficult implementation questions as it sought to restore reliability.
After a series of Aerotrain interruptions between July and October 2025, Malaysia Airports said that the 15 October disruption involved electrical systems while earlier incidents involved rolling-stock or traction systems supplied by different contractors. Loke said potential action against the contractors depended on their contractual obligations, and that the Malaysian Anti-Corruption Commission would decide independently whether corruption allegations warranted investigation. This record of technical disruptions and threatened enforcement should not be recast as proof that corruption had been established or that fines were finally imposed.

A train on the Ampang Line light-rail system derailed near Chan Sow Lin station on 28 May 2026. The 25 passengers were evacuated without injury. Loke described the incident as a serious safety matter, ordered an investigation involving the Land Public Transport Agency and called for accountability within Prasarana Malaysia. The inquiry and proposed sanctions should be distinguished from any later enforcement action actually taken.
Platform safety became a separate issue after a visually impaired passenger died following a fall onto the tracks at Titiwangsa station in February 2025 and another fatal fall occurred at Pusat Bandar Puchong in June. Loke called for platform screen doors and other protective systems. By April 2026, however, he acknowledged that retrofitting the older LRT network would be costly and technically complicated, and the ministry was also assessing warning sensors and other alternatives. The later review did not establish that the originally envisaged installation of screen doors throughout the network had been completed.
When the Shah Alam Line opened in late June 2026, the Sultan of Selangor, Sharafuddin of Selangor, publicly criticised earlier cost reductions and station cancellations made during the 2018–2020 PH administration under finance minister Lim Guan Eng and adviser Tony Pua. Loke said he would seek an audience with the Sultan to explain the ministry's understanding of the project, while acknowledging the ruler's concerns. The account involved contested interpretations of earlier procurement and cost-rationalisation decisions, and should not be presented as a dispute resolved by Loke's statement alone.

Public accountability and inherited infrastructure problems
An extensive April 2026 The Edge report described Loke's second ministerial term as dominated by maintenance problems in rail services, the rehabilitation of existing assets and procurement delays. It highlighted the KLIA Aerotrain replacement, which resumed operations in July 2025 after a lengthy upgrade and subsequently experienced repeated failures. The publication reported that Loke warned airport operators and contractors of potential financial penalties for failing to meet reliability requirements, while a maintenance reset temporarily improved operations. The report also attributed recurring disruptions on the Kelana Jaya Line partly to ageing rolling stock, with replacement trains not expected immediately.
Loke accepted responsibility for oversight in public statements but emphasised that infrastructure problems were often inherited across successive administrations. In a July 2026 interview with The Edge, he argued that government assets remain in use regardless of which coalition is in office, so incoming ministers have a duty to maintain and improve them even where procurement or design decisions predate their appointments. This account should be distinguished from external evaluations of service reliability and passenger impacts.
Broader assessments in 2025 and 2026 also identified shortcomings in crowd management, airport reliability and the quality of maintenance. Loke and ministry officials faced sustained criticism over recurring urban railway disruptions, while some transport projects made progress. These parallel developments complicate any simple account of the term as uniformly successful or unsuccessful.

Election results

Parliament of Malaysia

Negeri Sembilan State Legislative Assembly

Honours

Honours of Malaysia
Malaysia
Recipient of the 16th Yang di-Pertuan Agong Installation Medal (2019)
Recipient of the 17th Yang di-Pertuan Agong Installation Medal (2024)

Notes

References

External links

Loke's blog
Anthony Loke on Facebook
Anthony Loke on Instagram